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1  Introduction 
 
 
 
The object of this article is to explore and discuss the legal position and the role 
of  the  politics of the traditional leaders in the independent Bantustans  or 
homelands of apartheid South Africa. As a point of departure, this article gives 
a brief account of the status of the traditional leaders before the inception of 
apartheid.  In 1948,  the  now  defunct National Party (NP) won the general 
elections and ascended to political power. The party's victory was marked by 
the formal introduction of apartheid.
1  The main goal of  the  NP was racial, 
cultural and political purity.
2
                                            
*  Freddie Khunou. UDE (SEC) Moretele Training College of Education B Juris (Unibo) LLB 
(UNW) LLM (UNW) LLD (NWU Potchefstroom Campus). Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, 
North-West University, Mafikeng Campus. 
1   Gobodo-Madikizela A Human Being Died 144. The ideology of apartheid was laced with 
different terminologies such as multinational development, plural democracy and a 
confederation of independent nations or even good neighbourliness. See also Deane 2005 
Fundamina  1-3, where she stated that the aim of apartheid was to maintain white 
domination and extended racial segregation. Whites invented apartheid as a means to 
cement their power over the economic, political and social systems. See also Liebenberg 
"National Party" 481. According to Liebenberg, the apartheid policy was not a new one. It 
was an old policy, which could be traced back to the time when Jan van Riebeeck at the 
Cape planted a lane of wild almond trees to indicate the boundary between the Khoikhoi 
area and the white area. However, the policy applied after 1948 was different from the pre-
1948 policy. The difference lies in the ruthlessness of the  1948 policy  which  was 
implemented in South Africa. The 1948 policy was also enforced by the government with 
the aid of legislation. 
2   For more information on the issue of race, see West "Confusing Categories"  100-101. 
West asserted that the system of race classification in South Africa was often referred to 
as  "race classification". As West further noted the opponents and supporters of this 
classification regularly refer uncritically to race as the guiding principle. They argued that 
the system divided South Africans on the basis of colour and other physical features. 
According to West, classification is determined by several factors, which include inter alia 
appearance, descent, acceptance, language, behaviour and so on. It is on the basis of this 
account that West argued strongly that race classification was not based exclusively on 
the physical features of race. 
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The foundation of apartheid was premised on the formation of artificial black 
nations or homelands in reserves. These homelands were created on the basis 
of  the  language and culture of a particular ethnic group.
3
The TBVC states enacted a considerable number of legislative measures, 
which influenced the structures of traditional leadership. This article elaborates 
on how the TBVC states manipulated the institutions of traditional leadership 
and how the roles and powers of traditional authorities were greatly altered. 
This article further proceeds to examine the constitutional and legislative 
changes of directions which have been influenced by both the 1993
  The political 
leadership of the homelands served as the prototype of the disintegration of 
traditional authorities. The traditional authorities in these 'artificial'  states 
seemed to be used by the homelands' regime and were no longer accountable 
to their communities but to the entire political hegemony of apartheid. 
 
4 and 1996
5
2  Background perspectives 
 
Constitutions of South Africa and shows how these  changes have been 
initiated. The present South African government has launched a transformation 
project of the institution of traditional leadership. This project is intended to cure 
the ills of the past and democratise the institution in accordance with the 
constitutional imperatives. 
 
 
In the pre-colonial era, traditional leaders and traditional authorities were 
important institutions which gave effect to traditional life and played an essential 
role in the day-to-day administration of their areas and the lives of traditional 
                                            
3   For more information on culture, see Thornton "Culture" 19. Thornton asserted that the 
idea of "culture" has frequently been fused with that of society and had been used 
interchangeably to refer to a general social state of affairs or to a more or less clearly 
recognisable group of people. Ideas about 'cultures' and 'organisms' influenced each other 
in the development of theories of evolution, both cultural and biological. Sometimes people 
have argued that cultures are like organisms. Unfortunately for Thornton these ideas were 
confused and contributed nothing to a useful understanding of culture.  
4   The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. Hereinafter referred to as 
the Interim Constitution. 
5   Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996.  Hereinafter referred to as the 
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people. The relationship between the traditional community and traditional 
leader was very important. The normal functioning of the traditional community 
was the responsibility of the traditional authority.
6 The pre-colonial traditional 
leadership was based on governance of the people, where a traditional leader 
was accountable to his subjects. According to Spiegel and Boonzaier, there is 
much evidence that in pre-colonial times a significant proportion of the 
Southern African population was organised into political groupings with 
centralised authority vested in hereditary leaders known as 'chiefs'.
7
Before the inception of apartheid, the traditional authorities were the 
instruments of indirect rule. Indirect rule or rule by association, as Ntsebeza 
noted, was created to manage the Africans under the administrative rule rather 
than to enfranchise them.
 
 
8 The indirect rule was a British concept and not the 
making of the Afrikaner nationalists. The policy of indirect rule purported to 
preserve the pre-colonial structures of the traditional leadership. However, as 
Ntsebeza observed, in reality it was established as a means of controlling 
traditional communities in their areas.
9
                                            
6   Khunou  Legal History  2007 Z. See also the case of Shulubana  v Nwamitwa  2008 (9) 
BCLR 914 (CC) 933, where the Constitutional Court held that the traditional authorities' 
power is the high-water-mark of any power within the traditional community on matters of 
succession. The court held further that no other body in the community has more power 
than traditional authorities.  
7   Spiegel and Boonzaier "Promoting Tradition"  49.  The word  'chief'  was  used differently 
during the colonial and apartheid periods to refer to a leader of a traditional community. A 
'Chief'  was also known as Kaptein,  traditional authority, native leader, Bantu leader, 
African ruler, etc. However, under a new constitutional dispensation, the word 'chief' is no 
longer used and has been replaced by the words 'traditional leader'. The words 'Kgosi', 
'Morena',  'Inkosi',  'Hosi',  etc are also used depending on the language spoken by a 
particular traditional group. 
8   Ntsebeza Democracy Compromised 17. 
9   Ntsebeza (n 9) 17. 
 The leadership monopoly of traditional 
leaders changed when the colonial administrators and rulers introduced their 
authorities. Through the colonial system, traditional leaders became the agents 
of the colonial governments. The traditional authorities were recognised and 
shaped by colonial governments to suit, adopt and promote the objectives and 
aims of their colonial strategies and missions.  
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The successive colonial governments of South Africa enacted a considerable 
number of legislative measures to change the pre-colonial structures, roles and 
powers of the traditional leaders. For example, the Black Administration Act
10
At some point they withheld support from a particular traditional leader by 
appointing another in his place. They would also remove certain rights such as 
control over the distribution and administration of land. This resulted in a radical 
change in the leadership roles of the traditional leaders.
 
was enacted to give limited powers and roles to traditional leaders. This was 
due to the fact that the Governor-General was made the supreme chief of all 
traditional leaders in the Union of South Africa. The colonial and post-colonial 
governments recognised the institution of traditional leadership as an important 
political instrument.  
 
11
3  Strategic creation of homelands 
 What occurred in 
Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda  and  Ciskei provides a good example of 
change in the leadership roles of the traditional leaders. 
 
 
The borders of the homelands were 'fixed'  long before apartheid was 
introduced as an official government policy, namely by the 1913 Land Act
12 and 
the  1936 Trust and Land Act.
13  When Verwoerd became Prime Minister of 
South Africa in 1959, he introduced the Promotion of Black Self-Government 
Act.
14
                                            
10   Act 38 of 1927. 
11   Spiegel and Boonzaier (n 7) 49. 
12   Black Land Act 27 of 1913. Hereafter referred to as the 1913 Land Act. Through this Act, 
the majority of black people were deprived of their land. The traditional communities and 
their leaders lost vast tracks of land. This piece of legislation also restricted blacks from 
entering into agreement or transaction for the purchase, lease or the acquisition of land 
from whites. This meant that traditional leaders and members of their communities could 
not buy or acquire land from the whites for their communities. See also Cope South Africa 
18. 
13   Act 18 of 1936. The Native Trust Land Act  had the effect of reserving certain land in 
traditional communities for occupation by black people in traditional authorities' areas. With 
the introduction of this Act, more acres of land were added to the reserves thus making it 
possible for black communities to secure 13% of land.  
 The main objective of this Act was to create self-governing black units. 
14   Act 46 of 1959. The purpose of Act 46 of 1959 was among many other things intended to 
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The Black population was arranged and categorised into national units based 
on language and culture. There was the North-Sotho unit, the South-Sotho unit, 
the Swazi unit, the Tsonga unit, the Tswana unit, the Venda unit, the Xhosa unit 
and the Zulu unit.
15
The administrative authorities in these national units were to be based on the 
tribal system. The government's contention was that each nation had to 
develop according to its  own culture  and  under  its  own government. The 
government further argued that in this process of development, no nation was 
supposed to interfere with another.
 
 
16
The  Promotion of Black Self-Government Act  laid a foundation for the 
constitutionalisation of separate development. This is so because it had the 
effect of creating radical separation not only for blacks from the white South 
African population, but also of black ethnic groups from each other. This was 
aptly illustrated partly in the Preamble of the Act as follows:
  
 
17
The basis of the Promotion of Black Self-Government Act was to ensure that 
blacks lived in the Bantustans and ran their own affairs without any shares in 
the greater South Africa. The Bantu  reserves were transformed into 
 
 
The Bantu people of the Union of South Africa do not constitute a 
homogenous people, but form separate national units on the basis of 
language and culture … it is desirable for the welfare of the said 
people to afford recognition of the various national units and provide 
for their gradual development within their own to self-governing units 
on the basis of Bantu system of government …and its expedient to 
provide for direct consultation between the various Bantu national 
units and the government of the Union. 
 
                                                                                                                               
consultation between the government of the Union of South Africa and the national units in 
regard to matters affecting the interests of such national units. According to the Preamble 
of Act 46 of 1959, it was expedient to develop and extend the black system of government 
and to assign further powers, functions and duties to regional and territorial authorities. 
See also Beinart Twentieth Century South Africa 146. Beinart submitted that apartheid in 
its broader conception had increasingly become associated with Verwoerd. He further 
argued that Verwoerd dominated policy towards blacks. He described Verwoerd as one of 
the ideologues who moulded notions of separate cultures, nations and homelands. 
15   S 2(1) of Act 46 of 1959. 
16   Act 46 of 1959. The Act described the 'black population' as a heterogeneous group. 
17   See the Preamble of the Promotion of Black Self-Governing Act 46 of 1959. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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Bantustans, later called homelands. The communities in these Bantustans were 
to be guided and led by the traditional leaders. Traditional leaders were used by 
the system to sustain the legitimacy of the Bantustans because the idea of the 
homeland system was to divide and rule black people.
18
Verwoerd argued that the policy of independent black homelands would offer 
blacks economic opportunities and political representation in the reserves. As a 
result, traditional leaders were manipulated by the government to accept the 
idea of self-rule or independent homelands. Some of these homelands gained 
independence with the idea of forming a commonwealth with South Africa. This 
vision of grand apartheid became the ideal for white South Africa. The 
independence of the four South African homelands,  namely  Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana,  Venda  and Ciskei,  meant that all of  the Xhosa, Tswana, 
Venda and many other black population groups had effectively become 
foreigners in their own country.
 
 
19
The leaders of these four homelands who 'sold' their subjects out and accepted 
independence endorsed the idea of independence. Most of these leaders had 
in their personal capacities reaped the fruits of independence. To the apartheid 
government, the  vision of separate development was an alternative to 
domination by the black majority. To achieve this ideal, they thought it prudent 
to divide and rule the black majority. In fact, the plan to create the Bantustans 
was  a  result of fear of the united black community  by the apartheid 
government.
 
 
20
                                            
18   De Klerk The Man of His Time 8-9. Verwoerd is quoted by De  Klerk,  describing his 
viewpoint of the homelands system, as follows: "If we treat the Coloured, the Indian in 
such and such a manner, how will the Bantu Chief react? Will he not demand the same 
rights since he will not differentiate between one dark skin from another. And if he is 
granted those rights, will it not mean the end of our western civilization? Is it therefore not 
preferable that all persons of colour should be treated as races separate from the white, 
thereby eliminating all possibility of overthrowing western culture and western institution in 
South Africa? I say that if it is within the power of the Bantu, and if the territories in which 
he now lives can develop to full independence, they will develop in that way." 
19   The inhabitants of TBVC states were regarded as the citizens of their respective territories. 
As a consequence, they were stripped of their citizenship of South Africa. 
 
20   There were ten Bantustans which were created by the apartheid regime in South Africa. 
These were KwaZulu, Qwaqwa, KwaNdebele, KaNgwane, Lebowa, Gazankulu, Venda, 
Ciskei, Transkei and Bophuthatswana. The Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act 21 SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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After Verwoerd's assassination in 1966, Vorster became the Prime Minister of 
South Africa. According  to Walter, Vorster described his black policy, which 
differed little from that of his predecessor, as follows:
21
Vorster believed that separate development was the only policy that could 
accommodate otherwise irreconcilable political and cultural differences among 
the various national  groups. Therefore, he insisted that each nation was to 
determine its own future. One of the objectives of Vorster's government was to 
make South Africa safe for the white population. This could be achieved only if 
blacks were given citizenship of the homelands and denied citizenship of the 
so-called white South Africa. In 1970, the National States Citizenship Act
 
 
I believe in the policy of separate development, not as a philosophy 
but also as the only practical solution in the interests of everyone to 
eliminate frictions and to do justice to every population group as well 
as every individual. I say to the Coloured people, as well as to the 
Indians and the Bantu, that the policy of separate development is not 
a policy, which rests upon jealousy, fear or hatred. It is not a denial 
of the human dignity of anyone, nor is it so intended. On the 
contrary, it gives the opportunity to every individual, within his own 
sphere, not only to be a man or woman in every sense, but it also 
creates the opportunity for them to develop and advance without 
restriction or frustration as circumstances justify and in accordance 
with the demands or development achieved. 
 
22 was 
promulgated to provide citizenship to blacks in homelands.
23
This measure provided that all blacks of South Africa would be citizens of their 
respective homelands.
 
 
24
                                                                                                                               
of 1971 made provision for the establishment of self-governing territories. Unlike the states 
of Bophuthatswana, Transkei, Ciskei and Venda that opted for independence, the leaders 
of these territories had not accepted the idea of independence. These self-governing 
national units consisted of different and separate ethnic groups on the basis of language 
and culture, namely KaNgwane, Lebowa, KwaNdebele, Gazankulu, KwaZulu, and 
QwaQwa. 
21   Walter War against Capitalism 23. 
22   Act 26 of 1970. 
23  S 2 of Act 26 of 1970. 
24  S 5 of Act 26 of 1970. 
  The system was designed in such a way that 
Bophuthatswana would be the homeland for the Tswana, Venda for the 
Vendas, Transkei for the Xhosas and Ciskei for the Xhosas as well. In other SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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words, this Act eliminated all blacks from the Republic of South Africa, thereby 
taking a policy of separate development to its full fruition. As a result, black 
South Africans became citizens of ten homelands depending on their ethnic 
groups.
25 The NP government intended to achieve a policy of pure apartheid by 
racial separation.
26
The Department of Native Affairs was mandated to shape the policy of racial 
discrimination by creating more black nations with languages, cultures and 
interests of their own.
  
 
27 It seems Jansen, the then Minister of Native Affairs, 
hoped that by creating more black nations, the government would foster 
solidarity between different traditional communities in South Africa. In fact, the 
policy of apartheid divided and separated traditional communities. In so doing, 
apartheid sowed the seeds of hatred and hostility between different traditional 
communities. The apartheid government was successful in sustaining its policy 
of tribal divisions for many decades.
28 For example, Transkei became a self-
governing territory in 1963 and was the only homeland which was dealt with 
outside the Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act.
29
The Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act
 
 
30
                                            
25   Act 26 of 1970. Finally, in 1970, all black people in South Africa were stripped of their 
citizenship. 
26   Chidester  Religions  204. Chidester confirmed this new order of separate development 
when he quoted one of the Ministers of Bantu Administration, Mulder, when he said that: 
"If our policy is taken to its logical conclusion as far as the Bantu people are concerned, 
there will be no one black with South African citizenship." 
27   Chidester (n 26) 205. Chidester further cited the Minister of Native Affairs, Jansen saying: 
"We are of the opinion that the solidarity of the tribes should be preserved and that they 
should develop along the lines of their own national character and tradition." 
28   It was through the policy of apartheid that the traditional communities and families were 
disintegrated. Furthermore, members of the same traditional community were separated 
and fragmented. The whole notion of apartheid was the antithesis of the notion of unity 
and cohesion among the black people of South Africa. For example, in 1963 Transkei 
received its self-government status. This was an achievement on the part of the apartheid 
government in breaking the unity and cohesion among the black of South Africa.  
29   See  Transkei Constitution  Act 48 of 1963. The Transkei Constitution established a 
unicameral legislative assembly consisting of 109 members,  of whom  45 were directly 
elected by all Transkeian citizens and 65 ex-officio members comprised Paramount Chief 
and other traditional leaders. The Constitution further made provision for the granting of 
Transkeian citizenship as well as national symbols such as a flag and anthem and coat of 
arms. See also in this regard Vorster "Constitution" 25. 
30   Act 21 of 1971. 
 provided for the establishment 
of legislative assemblies and executive governments vested in executive SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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councils in respect of homelands.
31  With the introduction of this Act, self-
governing territories were allowed to legislate for their citizens. It was also 
through the passage of this Act that blacks were to run their own affairs in their 
homelands. According to Balatseng and Van der Walt, homeland leaders could 
pass their own legislation only  with the permission of the South African 
government. This demonstrates the fact that the South African government was 
still in control of the homelands.
32 The Act also provided for the recognition and 
retention of the functions and powers lawfully exercised by traditional leaders in 
terms of the Bantu Authorities Act.
33  As a result, both tribal and regional 
authorities were retained while territorial authorities were disestablished.
34
The conditions in the homelands were not conducive to  the creation of 
employment. Some land in the homelands was barren and not good for any 
kind of development. Although poverty in the homelands was  a  cause for 
concern, the homelands' leaders used public funds for their personal gains and 
worthless projects.
 
 
35
                                            
31  S 1 of Act 21 of 1971. TARG Report on Conference Documentation 24. TARG team stated 
that the promulgation of Act 21 of 1971 was a step further on the part of the apartheid 
government to realise the goal of denying the black people any claim in the government of 
South Africa. According to TARG, blacks had to govern themselves in small patches of 
land far from industrial and commercial sites. Traditional leaders in these homelands also 
played a very crucial role in assisting the government to achieve its goal of entrenching 
apartheid. 
32   Balatseng and Van der Walt "History of Traditional Authorities" 8. 
33   S 11 of Act 21 of 1971. 
34   S 12 and 13 of Act 21 of 1971. 
35   South Africa Debates of the National Assembly 782. Commenting on the Economic Co-
operation and Promotion Loan Fund Amendment Bill, Dalling ANC MP stated that the so-
called homelands' prime and only exports were the sweat and the toil of their people who 
were forced into a cruel system of contract and migratory labour. He went on to say that: 
"Perhaps it is important to reflect on how much of the money handed over to the petty 
dictatorships of the TBVC territories was wasted and not used for beneficial purposes. I 
remember for instance, Lennox Sebe built the extravagant international airport, which 
during the entire life of the state of Ciskei never saw the landing of any aircraft from any 
country other than from South Africa. President Sebe also purchased two – not one, but 
two jets for his planned Ciskei Airline. This cost several million and stood idle on the airport 
apron for years. Mr Mangope and Chief Matanzima used South African money to build 
their palaces, to stock their farms and so on."  
  Malnutrition was common in the communities of these 
homelands, not forgetting the overcrowding due to the acute shortage of land in SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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traditional communities. Therefore, the introduction of the system of the 
homelands worsened the living conditions of the black people.
36
4  Independent Bantustans 
  
 
 
4.1   Transkei 
The 'architects' of the independence of Transkei sought to justify their political 
legitimacy by producing a mixture of both democratic and tribal policies. 
According to Chidester, an election held in 1963 in Transkei, which led to the 
creation of self-government, was intended to legitimise the idea of the 
homeland system.
37 The status of self-government in Transkei was conferred 
on Transkei through the passage of the Transkei Constitution Act.
38 This was 
followed by the Status of Transkei Act,
39  which granted  independence to 
Transkei.
40
The  Status of Transkei Act  endorsed the status, roles and functions of 
traditional leaders in the Legislative Assembly of the Transkei as constituted in 
terms of the Transkei Constitution Act.
 
 
41
                                            
36   The black inhabitants of the homelands were thoroughly subjected to untold suffering and 
poor socio-economic conditions. For instance,  the majority of them  had no access to 
electricity, clean water, sanitation and so forth. However, in homelands  such as 
Bophuthatswana there were a considerable number of developmental projects, which 
signified economic growth and progress. Some of the residents of Bophuthatswana had 
access to clean water, electricity and sanitation. For more information on the development 
of the homelands, see Sharp "Two Worlds" 128. Sharp argued that development was a 
crucial aspect of separate development or apartheid. He further argued that as the racial 
policy unfolded, the development policies of the state were continually adapted, develop-
ment priorities re-defined, and development goals altered accordingly. The question is: to 
what extent did racial policy or apartheid influence development in the homelands? If racial 
policy or apartheid indeed influenced development in the homelands as Sharp argued, 
why was apartheid widely condemned by both the black majority and international 
communities? The issue of development in this context remains a moot point. 
37   Chidester (n 26) 207-208. 
38   Act 48 of 1963. 
39   Act 100 of 1976. 
40   See  the  Republic of Transkei Constitution Act 3  of  1976. Transkei adopted this 
Constitution when independence was granted to it by SA in 1976. S 22 of Act 3 of 1976 
provided inter alia for the representation of traditional leaders in the National Assembly. 
The National Assembly consisted of the Paramount Chiefs and 72 traditional leaders who 
represented the districts of Transkei.  
41   Act 48 of 1963. 
  In other words, this Act indirectly SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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recognised the legislative role of traditional leaders in Transkei. The majority of 
seats in the legislature were reserved for traditional leaders  because the 
homeland leaders continuously enjoyed their support. These traditional leaders 
were given seats in the legislature to give the homeland system the flavour of a 
democratic mandate. The Transkei Authorities Act
42  was promulgated to 
regulate the institution of traditional leaders. Traditional leaders in Transkei 
were used as 'puppets' to legitimise the notion of separate development. In this 
regard, it is important to note that the creators of the homeland of Transkei 
used traditional leaders to validate the so-called 'independence' of Transkei.
43
The white authorities employed traditional leaders who participated in the 
Transkei government.  The majority of those traditional leaders who 
collaborated with the white regime as early as the introduction of the Black 
Authorities Act
 
 
44
Chief  Matanzima was declared a Paramount Chief by the South African 
government when conflict arose in the 1960s between Chief Matanzima and 
the Paramount Chief of the Tembu. Chidester noted that in 1979, when Chief 
Matanzima was in power in the homeland, he stripped the Paramount Chief of 
the Tembu of his traditional authority and had him arrested because of his anti-
  were minor traditional leaders. For instance, the leading 
traditional leader of Transkei, Chief Matanzima, who later became its President, 
was a minor traditional leader under the authority of the Paramount Chief of the 
Tembu. 
 
                                            
42   Act 4 of 1965. This Act dealt inter alia  with matters pertaining to the  appointment, 
recognition, suspension and deposition of traditional leaders in Transkei. In Matanzima v 
Holomisa  1992 (3) SA 876 (TK-CD), the court dealt with the matter concerning the 
suspension of a Paramount Chief in terms of s 47 (1)(b) of the Transkei Authorities Act 4 
of 1965. The court found that the suspension affected the interests and the reputation of 
the suspended Chief and secondly there was  non-compliance with the audi alteram 
partem maxim. The court further stated that the position of the Paramount Chief and the 
tribal authority are institutions which give effect to tribal custom and hierarchy and play an 
important role in the day-to-day administration of the area and in the lives of the 
Transkeian citizens. The mere existence of the tribal authority and the position of 
Paramount Chief, Chiefs and headmen is evidence of the tribal customary ways of all 
Transkeians. The position of Paramount Chief is hereditable and the suspension of a 
Paramount Chief must be seen against this background. 
43   Chidester (n 26) 207. 
44   Act 68 of 1951. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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independence stance.
45 Chief Matanzima undoubtedly supported the idea of 
separate development. He declared at the Transkei celebration in 1968 that:
46
Lipton held the view that the argument of  Chief  Matanzima to accept 
independence and also the loss of South African citizenship was that partition 
in their own separate states was the only way blacks could win their political 
rights, and that the history and cultural identity of Transkei made it as  well 
qualified for independence as neighbouring Lesotho. Many nominated 
traditional leaders supported this policy of Chief Matanzima. These were the 
people whom Lipton called its 'beneficiaries'.
 
 
We believe in the sincerity of Dr Verwoerd's policy. The Transkei 
should cling to its ideals and continue building its nationhood as a 
separate entity…within the framework of separate development.  
 
47  According to Matanzima the 
independence of Transkei was to assert the political and economic freedom of 
the Xhosas. Matanzima quoted Verwoerd saying that:
48
Bophuthatswana became a self-governing homeland in 1972 and gained  its 
nominal independence on 6 December 1977.
  
 
We will have in the Transkei…an independent state of multi-racial 
character with a free economy. It will be a sovereign state that will 
conduct its own affairs… We feel that this will benefit the black man 
not only in the Transkei but also in the Republic… 
 
 
4.2  Bophuthatswana 
49 Bophuthatswana was granted 
independence through the enactment of the Status of Bophuthatswana Act.
50
                                            
45   Chidester (n 26) 207. 
46   Chidester (n 26) 208. 
47   Lipton  Capitalism  298.  According to  Lipton,  the Matanzima brothers also supported 
Matanzima's policy. They were rewarded by the Transkei Assembly (TA) for their faithful 
service in the development of Transkei by granting them valuable farms in the land 
transferred by SA to Transkei. 
48   Matanzima Independence 85. 
49   See the Republic of Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 18 of 1977.  
 
50   Act 89 of 1977. The sovereign and independent status of Bophuthatswana was questioned 
in the case of S v Banda  (1989-1990) BLR 45-53. The defence contended that 
Bophuthatswana was not recognised by any state except South Africa nor was a member 
of  the  United Nations. It was further contended that by virtue of its non-recognition, 
Bophuthatswana did not have the attributes of a sovereign, independent state. This 
contention followed the theory of the constitutive school, which postulated that by non-
recognition, Bophuthatswana was not a sovereign entity although on the basis of the SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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Although the Status of Bophuthatswana Act  did not directly articulate and 
define the roles, functions and powers of traditional leaders, it did so tacitly 
when it recognised the Legislative Assembly of Bophuthatswana as constituted 
in terms of the Self-Governing Territories Constitution Act,
51 which gave direct 
recognition
52  to the authority of traditional leaders in the Legislative 
Assembly.
53
Later,  land acquired by the South African Development Trust (SADT) was 
added into Bophuthatswana.
  
Bophuthatswana consisted of tribal land, initially administered as a black 
reserve under the authority of the traditional leaders.  
 
54
                                                                                                                               
declaratory theory it might be a sovereign independent state. The state argued that the 
question of non-recognition was inspired by political considerations. The state further 
argued that Bophuthatswana was recognised as an independent state according to the law 
of South Africa and that it complied with the essentials of statehood according to the 
norms of international law. The court concluded that Bophuthatswana was an independent 
sovereign state possessing majestas. The court applied s  1 and 2 of the Status of 
Bophuthatswana Act 89 of 1977, which provided that: "Bophuthatswana is hereby declared 
to be a sovereign and independent state and shall cease to be part of the Republic of 
South Africa and the Republic of South Africa shall cease to exercise any authority over 
Bophuthatswana". The court therefore rejected the notion that Bophuthatswana was an 
agent or an extension of the Republic of South Africa.  
51   Act 21 of 1971. 
52   See also s 56 of the Bophuthatswana Constitution Act 18 of 1977, which provided for the 
retention of the personal status of traditional leaders in Bophuthatswana and recognised 
the authority of traditional leaders. S  57 of the Bophuthatswana Constitution further 
provided that the designation of Chiefs, acting Chiefs, headmen, acting headmen and 
independent headmen vested in the President of Bophuthatswana. In recognising a Chief, 
the President was required to do so with proper observance of the law and customs of the 
traditional community concerned. In case a conflict occurred with regard to such law and 
customs, proper steps had to be taken to establish correct law and customs and such 
conflict to be resolved before the  President could properly exercised his powers. In 
Molotlegi v President of Bophuthatswana 1989 (3) SA 119 (B), the court held that s 57 of 
the Constitution and s 36(1) of the Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act 23 of 1978 
empowered the President to appoint and recognise George Molotlegi (not a Chief) as 
acting Chief of the tribe. The court further held that the President as he was obliged to do 
by s 36(1) had recognised George Molotlegi as acting Chief with due observance of the 
law and customs of the tribe. The President's appointment was held to be valid. In Deputy 
Minister of Tribal Authorities v Kekana 1983 (3) SA 492 (B), it was alleged that the Deputy 
Minister failed to have due regard to the traditional laws and customs of the tribe when he 
deposed a Chief and recognised another. The court held that the Minister exercised his 
administrative discretion correctly by having due regard to the traditional laws and customs 
of the tribe concerned. In Mosome v Makapan 1986 (2) SA 44 (B), the court held that s 36 
of the Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act 23 of 1978 did not compel the President 
to adhere slavishly to tribal law and customs among the factors on which he based the 
exercise of his discretion. 
53   S 11 of Act 21 of 1971. 
54   Francis 2002 JSAS  532-533. Bophuthatswana was politically controlled by the then 
apartheid SA government and depended on it financially and economically. 
 Lawrence and Manson pointed out that Chief SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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Mangope, who was its President until March 1994, emphasised the ethnic 
origin of the Tswana nation and his own position as an important and powerful 
traditional leader within this ethno-national entity.
55 Chief Mangope claimed to 
be a significant paramount traditional leader of Bahurutshe and the main 
architect of Bophuthatswana and its transition to modernity. It was in this sense 
that Chief Mangope justified his control over the Bantustan structures on the 
basis of his status as a traditional leader of significant status. However, 
Lawrence and Manson explained that Chief Mangope's claim to paramountcy 
even over Bahurutshe lacked both validity and legitimacy.
56
Chief Mangope gave the origins of Bophuthatswana mythical justifications. For 
instance, he emphasised the fact that the Tswana people emerged from a bed 
of reeds of Ntswana Tsatsi.
 
 
57 Mangope believed that history,
58 which placed 
the Tswana on the political map, began and moved through the stages of 
homeland development and led to the granting of Bophuthatswana's 
independence by the South African government in December 1977.
59 When 
Bophuthatswana was declared an independent state, Chief Mangope stated 
that the event was a turning point in history.
60
Bophuthatswana introduced the Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act
  
  
61
                                            
55   Lawrence and Manson 1994 JSAS 449. 
56   Lawrence and Manson (n 55)  46. 
57   Ntswana Tsatsi is a Tswana phrase, which means the place where the sun sets. 
58   Lawrence and Manson (n 55) 450. 
59   Lawrence and Manson (n 55) 451. The Mangope clan was at one time amongst the 
Bahurutshe but it did not occupy land in the reserve north of Zeerust. Due to the shortage 
of land the  Mangope clan moved to today's Botswana. Twenty years later, this group 
returned to the Zeerust reserve. But since they had left the area, they were under legal 
obligation to accept the authority of Chief Gopane. In 1941,  the independence of 
Bahurutshe at Motswedi was recognised and that move drove Mangope's family to the 
government. 
60   Chidester  (n 26) 210. Chidester cited Mangope as  saying the following words in a 
symposium held in Germany in 1986, to justify the political legitimacy of Bophuthatswana: 
"The concept of homeland should be used in referring to his nation in the same sense that 
Jewish people use it when they refer to Israel, that is, as the ancestral land of their 
forefathers, the forefathers of my people; the Tswana, were buried in Bophuthatswana." 
 
to regulate the institution of traditional leadership. The Act prescribed the 
61   Act 23 of 1978. This legislation regulated and defined the scope of the duties, authority 
and functions of Chiefs and headmen in Bophuthatswana. The powers and functions of the 
Chief of Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela were also tailored and defined by this legislation. S 38 (a) of 
the  Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities Act provided that a chief or headman shall SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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powers, functions and roles of the traditional authorities.
62 In terms of this Act, 
traditional leaders were also made ex-officio members of the Bophuthatswana 
parliament.
63 As members of parliament, they were paid salaries or stipends.
64 
In this regard,  the  Bophuthatswana government almost placed all of  the 
traditional leaders in the centre of  the  political bureaucratic arena. It was 
through this legislative measure that the independence and authority of 
traditional leaders were eroded and curtailed
65 in Bophuthatswana. The reason 
for this assertion is that those traditional leaders who would not toe the line 
were deposed and replaced by appointed traditional leaders.
66
Chief Lebone of the Bafokeng traditional community near Rustenburg defied 
Chief Mangope outright. He refused to hoist the Bophuthatswana flag at the 
local tribal offices. Chief Lebone also instructed  the Bafokeng to relinquish 
Bophuthatswana citizenship. The Bophuthatswana government declared a 
state of emergency in Phokeng and ordered a Commission of Inquiry into the 
affairs of the Bafokeng traditional community. According to Cooper et al, about 
20 headmen told the Commission that they preferred a traditional form of 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
enjoy the status, rights and privileges and duties conferred or imposed upon his office by 
the recognised customs or usages of his tribe or community. This piece of legislation 
recognised the duties and powers of the Tswana Chiefs conferred upon them by custom or 
customary law. The Act further provided that the Chief shall generally seek to promote the 
interests of his tribe or community and actively support and himself initiate measures for 
the advancement of his peoples. It is in this context of development and advancement of 
the tribe that the Act made provision for the tribal authority account. The Act required the 
President of Bophuthatswana to open in the office of every Magistrate in respect of each 
tribal authority an account into which tribal accounts will be paid. These accounts included: 
(a) All fees and charges which according to the laws and customs of the tribe are payable 
to the tribal authority, (b) All amounts from any property of the tribal authority, (c) Any 
donation made by any person for the benefit of the tribal authority, (d) All other amounts 
derived from any source whatsoever for the benefit of the tribal authority including 
amounts payable to the tribal authority which the National Assembly may grant for the 
purpose. 
62  S 19 of Act 23 of 1978. 
63  S 27 of Act 23 of 1978. 
64  S 39 of Act 23 of 1978. 
65   Eg, the judicial powers of the traditional leaders in Bophuthatswana were curtailed through 
the Traditional Courts Act 29 of 1979. This included the powers of the traditional leaders to 
impose corporal punishment on married men over 30 years. This position was confirmed in 
the case of S v Molubi 1988 (2) SA 576 (B), where the court held that the judicial powers 
of traditional leaders in Bophuthatswana were limited by the Traditional Courts Act 29 of 
1979 and therefore traditional courts had no power to impose strokes on a married men 
over 30 years for contempt of court even if committed in facie curiae. 
66   Balatseng and Van der Walt (n 32) 23. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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government under the leadership of Chief Lebone to that of the elected 
Bophuthatswana government.
67
The activities of the Bafokeng tribal police also widened the rift between Chiefs 
Mangope and Lebone. The Bafokeng tribal police instituted a reign of terror on 
the non-Tswana and those who haboured them. These non-Tswanas were tried 
in Phokeng before a tribal court. Those who could not afford to pay their fines 
were sjambokked.
  
 
68 Although non-Tswanas were unpopular with Mangope, the 
cruel behaviour of the tribal police moved them more closely to Chief Mangope 
than Chief Lebone. Mangope capitalised on the activities of the tribal police to 
attack Chief Lebone and his tribal police for  abusing  non-Tswanas and the 
landlords who rented them their houses.
69
It also transpired that it was not only Bafokeng who wished to relinquish their 
Bophuthatswana citizenship. A large group of Ndebele who lived in the 
Hammanskraal area of Bophuthatswana led by Chief Kekana also threatened 
to secede. According to Cooper et al, Mangope warned them that unless they 
became citizens of Boputhatswana, they would be evicted from the land where 
they lived. The cases of Chief Lebone and Chief Kekana demonstrate that 
traditional leaders in Bophuthatswana ran the risk of being deposed or 
harassed by Chief Mangope.
 
 
70
In most cases, Mangope relied on the Bophuthatswana Traditional Authorities 
Act, which gave him as President of Bophuthatswana the powers to recognise, 
appoint
 
 
71 and depose traditional leaders.
72
                                            
67   Cooper et al Survey 295. 
68   The non-Tswanas were mainly the Xhosas from the defunct Transkei and Ciskei 
homelands,  as well as the Sothos from Lesotho who worked in Bafokeng mines and 
resided in Bafokeng as tenants. Those who were mainly harassed and flogged by the 
police were the wives of these non-Tswanas. 
69   It was also discovered that some of these non-Tswanas who were harassed by the 
Bafokeng tribal police had documentary proof of land ownership. It was alleged that 
corrupt headmen sold tribal land to more than 2000 illegal squatters in Phokeng. 
70   Cooper (n 67) 295. 
 This Act was to a very large extent a 
71   In Chief Pilane v Chief Linchwe 1995 (4) SA 686 (B), the court held that in terms of the 
Traditional Authorities Act 23 of 1978, the law and customs of the tribe concerned must be 
considered and that  the Constitution of Bophuthatswana never intended to give the 
President the right to appoint anyone as Chief, but that the laws and customs of the tribe SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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replica of the Black Administration Act.
73 Like the Governor-General (later State 
President) under the Black Administration Act,
74  the President of 
Bophuthatswana also had the power to depose a traditional leader or headman 
and install his appointed traditional or acting leader.  For example,  in  1985, 
Chief  Mangope invoked the provision of this Act when he deported Chief 
Lebone  under the guise that he wanted to topple the State President of 
Bophuthatswana.
75
It is also significant to note that both the central and local government of 
Bophuthatswana were firmly anchored in the institution of traditional leadership. 
Chief Mangope, the President of Bophuthatswana, was a traditional leader of 
the  Bahurutshe Bo-Manyane.  The Bophuthatswana government appointed 
traditional leaders and some of these traditional leaders were members of the 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
concerned must be considered, and also the acceptability of the person to the tribe. The 
appointment of a Chief who was not acceptable to the tribe would result in an intolerable 
situation. The court concluded that Chief Nyalala Pilane was most acceptable to the 
overwhelming majority of the tribe and that in recognising him the ex-President certainly 
followed the laws and customs of the tribe. The court ordered that the Premier who 
superseded the President should formalise the appointment of Chief Nyalala Pilane as a 
Chief of Bakgatla-Ba-Kgafela in Saulspoort. 
72   S 36(2) and 42(4)(e) of Act 23 of 1978. 
73   Act 38 of 1927. 
74   S 1 of Act 38 of 1927. In Minister of Native Affairs v Buthelezi 1961 (1) SA 766 (A), the 
court held that the appointment of a Chief is made by the Governor-General as Supreme 
Chief. The court further stated that there is nothing in the Black Administration Act or any 
other statutory provision, which in any way limits the discretion vested in the Governor-
General in regard to the appointment of a Chief. See Buthelezi v Minister of Bantu 
Administration 1961 (3) SA 760 (CLD), where the court stated that in all cases of quarrels 
regarding chieftainships or successions to chieftainships the Chief Native Commissioner 
had to make an enquiry for the information of the Governor-General in his capacity as the 
Supreme Chief of all Chiefs in South Africa. In Saliwa v Minister of Native Affairs 1956 (2) 
SA (AD) 310 the court stated that the Governor-General has absolute power as  the 
Supreme Chief in native law and he had no obligation to grant a person hearing before the 
order of removal or dismissal is granted. See also Sibasa v Ratsialingwa 1947 (4) 369 
(TPD), where the court held that the Governor-General in his capacity as Paramount Chief 
has a legal right to depose a Chief. The court also confirmed the powers of the Govenor-
General in respect of the traditional leaders in Mabe v Minister for Native Affairs 1958 (2) 
SA (TPD) where the court dealt with a matter concerning the deposition of a Chief by the 
Governor-General. The Governor-General relied on information put before him that a Chief 
was not fit to be a Chief. The Governor-General accepted that information and determined 
that the Chief should no longer hold an appointment as Chief. The court concluded that the 
Governor-General's decision in good faith could not be set aside even if the information 
upon which he acted was subsequently found to be incorrect. 
75   For instance, when Chief Mangope stripped Chief Lebone of his office and sent him to 
exile, he appointed Edward Mokgwaro the younger brother of Chief Lebone as the 
Paramount Chief of Bafokeng traditional community. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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Cabinet and the Bophuthatswana parliament.
76 Francis posited that while some 
of the traditional leaders were popularly considered legitimate, some were 
thought to be little more than stooges.
77
According to Francis, Mangope's regime was characterised by personal rule 
and was held together by patronage and corruption. In this regard, jobs, land 
and trading licenses were pieces of patronage distributed in ways that aimed to 
maintain and sustain political support. Political activities were banned and the 
opposition was severely punished, repressed and intimidated.
  
 
78 This political 
climate made it impossible to develop strong participatory political institutions in 
Bophuthatswana, which  was mostly an authoritarian and unpopular 
Bantustan.
79  It alienated its inhabitants and did not create loyalty. The 
government of Bophuthatswana failed to achieve legitimacy or even credibility 
with the majority of its people or with  South Africa. According to Lipton, 
Bophuthatswana instead became ridiculed as a Casinostan and a source of 
cheap labour.
80
                                            
76   S 36(1) and 57(1) of Act 23 of 1978. 
77   Francis (n 54) 532-533. 
78   Francis (n 54) 532-533. The government of Bophuthatswana had a tendency to violate the 
fundamental human rights entrenched in the Constitution of Bophuthatswana. For 
instance, freedom of movement and association and freedom of speech were severely 
curtailed. In Segale v Bophuthatswana Government 1987 (3) SA 237 (B), the court stated 
that s 31 of the Internal Security Act 32 of 1981, which required the political parties to 
apply for permission to the government to hold meetings, was ultra vires the Constitution 
of Bophuthatswana. However, in Government of Bophuthatswana v Segale 1990 (1) SA 
434 (BA), the Appeal Court of Bophuthatswana stated that the ban on meetings in terms of 
s  31 of the  Internal Security Act 32 of 1979 could not be said to be permanent and 
therefore ultra vires the Constitution of Bophuthatswana, as it was for the parliament to 
decide when the provision of s 31 should be relaxed. See also Lewis v Minister of Internal 
Affairs 1991 (3) SA 628 (B), where the court accordingly found that the Minister's power to 
order the removal of persons from Bophuthatswana in the interest of public safety was not 
unconstitutional. The cases of Lewis and Segale (appeal case) failed because the 
appellants failed to appreciate that the Constitution of Bophuthatswana was not only a 
supreme statute but that  it was also supreme authority. The Constitution of 
Bophuthatswana provided a framework for  and set limits on  governmental  power and 
acted as a controlling instrument against which all other laws were to be tested. The 
restrictions imposed on the political parties and citizens of Bophuthatswana by the 
government were seen in the light of this being a state which oppressed its people. 
79   Francis (n 54) 533. In the 1990s the landscape of politics changed drastically in South 
Africa. Mandela was released from prison and the realities of the new South Africa based 
on the ideals of democracy and freedom became evident. 
80   Lipton (n 47) 339. Places like Sun City, the gambling den of Bophuthatswana, attracted 
white South Africans who usually indulged in the gambling, mixed sex and blue sex 
forbidden in puritan South Africa. 
  Of much importance is the fact that the Bophuthatswana 
government relied entirely on the support of traditional leaders to mobilise SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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voters in the traditional authorities'  areas.  Suffice it to say that the political 
survival of Bophuthatswana revolved around support of the institution of 
traditional leadership. 
 
4.3  Venda 
Venda
81 was the smallest of the four independent black states in South Africa. 
The Venda National Party (VNP) under the leadership of Chief Mphephu was 
the political vehicle which introduced Venda to independence.
82
Venda became the third homeland to gain independence from the South 
African government, with the introduction of the Status of Venda Act
  The VNP 
consisted mainly of traditionalists, particularly of traditional leaders. The VNP 
came into power in 1973 and was returned to power in the  independence 
elections in 1979, largely as a result of the influence of traditional leaders and 
headmen.  
 
83 on 13 
September 1979. Although the Venda Independent Party (VIP), the opposition 
party, won the overwhelming majority of elected seats in both the 1973 and 
1978 elections, the ruling party, assumed power each time because the support 
of the VNP by the nominated traditional leaders decided  the results in the 
National Assembly.
84
                                            
81   TARG Report on Politico-Historical Background 4-5. According to TARG, the Venda 
homeland consisted of six districts and covered a total area of approximately 639 000 
hectares.  These districts were again divided into tribal areas. The characteristic of the 
political system amongst the VhaVenda was that it was highly centralised, in the sense 
that each tribal area was under the authority of a traditional leader assisted by his sub-
Chiefs and headmen.  In most cases this hierarchy of subordinate headmen was 
hereditary. TARG report states that in the VhaVenda community a traditional leader often 
performed ritual on a tribal or national scale and was himself frequently believed to have a 
mystical relationship with the ancestors and the land. He was described as the 'owner' of 
tribal land because it was believed that he was by tradition the protector of the people and 
their lands.  
82   The Status of Venda Act 107 of 1979 preceded the independence of Venda. According to 
the Status of Venda Act, the Legislative Assembly of Venda was authorised to pass laws 
including a Constitution. See the Constitution of the Republic of Venda Act 9 of 1979. 
Traditional leaders were represented in the National Assembly of the Republic of Venda. 
83   Act 107 of 1979. 
 The traditional leaders seemed to be used as barriers 
against democracy. 
84   Cooper (n 67) 297. The dominance of the traditional leaders in the government of Venda 
made it unpopular with  the vast majority of the citizens of Venda. In Tshivhase Royal 
Council v Tshivhase 1990 (3) SA 828 (V), the court stated that the tribal system embedded SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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The Venda hegemony was centred on the institution of traditional leadership. 
The  Venda Tribal and Regional Councils Act
85  regulated the institution of 
traditional leadership.  The traditional leaders were manipulated  by Chief 
Mphephu to lubricate the political wheel of the Bantustan administration of 
Venda. It was difficult to refer to Venda as a democratic state or homeland. 
Chief Mphephu confirmed this proposition when he announced his intention to 
declare Venda a one party state because the western style of democracy was 
not appropriate to  and compatible  with  an African country like Venda. This 
announcement justified Mphephu's sense of intolerance of democracy and 
political opposition.
86
In 1983, Chief Mphephu became life President of the homeland. In 1984, the 
first post-independence elections were held in Venda. The VNP won 41 of the 
45 elected seats. During the independence of Venda political activity was not 
tolerated and members of the opposition were detained. This earned 
Mphephu's administration a reputation for ruthlessness. It is important to note 
that since it was mainly  the  traditional leaders who  ruled Venda,  they 
perpetrated oppressive violations  of  human rights and therefore became 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
in government had two main drawbacks for a fast-growing country like Venda, firstly in that 
it created a parallel system of government to the newly formed National Assembly and 
State President, thereby acting as a retarding force in certain highly desirable 
developments such as land reform and private land ownership, and secondly in that it 
tended to divide the tribe rather than unite it, as it served to perpetuate old tribal rivalries 
and feuds. 
85   Act 10 of 1975. This Act repealed the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 as far as Venda was 
concerned. The primary objective of Act 10 of 1975 was to deal with the following matters: 
(a) To substitute Tribal and Regional Councils for the Tribal and Regional Authorities in 
Venda. (b) To define their constitution, powers, authorities and functions. (c) To regulate 
the appointment, deposition, discharge and discipline of Paramount Chiefs, Chiefs and 
headmen and to define their powers, functions and duties. S 35 of Act 10 of 1975 provided 
for the functions and duties of the traditional leaders in Venda as follows: (a) To exercise 
their functions in terms of indigenous law and custom. (b) To maintain law and order. (c) 
To report without delay any matters of concern including any condition of unrest or 
dissatisfaction. (d) To ensure the protection of life, person and property. (e) To disperse or 
order the dispersal on any unlawful meeting or gathering. (f) To make known to the 
residents of their areas the requirements of any law. (g) To ensure compliance with all 
laws, orders and instructions of any competent authority. 
86   Codman 1986 www.nu.ac.za/ 82. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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unpopular in Venda.
87
Another critical element which reduced and undermined the status and pride of 
traditional leaders in Venda was the dramatic resurgence of witchcraft in 
Venda. According to Minnaar, witchcraft cases posed a serious challenge and 
threats to the credibility of traditional leaders. Some of the traditional leaders 
were accused of working in cahoots with  the  witches.
  They became the enemies of the people and the 
servants of apartheid. 
 
88  It should also be 
remembered that after the death of Chief Mphephu in April 1988, a 
considerable number of cases of witchcraft  and medicine murders were 
reported. Some believed that Chief Mphephu made it difficult for the people to 
attack the witches because he was linked with witchcraft. This resulted into 
witch burning. When the climate of terror intensified, anyone accused of being a 
witch was simply killed on the spot despite protestations of innocence. Minaar 
observed that in some villages up to five or more accused witches were either 
killed or driven out of their homes each night.
89
Various reasons were advanced for both the witch burnings and muti.
  
 
90
                                            
87   TARG Report on Politico-Historical Background 16-17. TARG team noted that the public 
opinion was that traditional leaders had been turned into politicians by the homeland's 
politics, a system, which was not popular with many people because they were seen as 
upholders of that system. As a result, traditional leaders became a target of the politicised 
youth. These youth fought the traditional leaders in traditional authorities' areas. They saw 
traditional leaders and the government as the supporters of apartheid. As a result, they 
continued to be in the  forefront of the political struggle. After the death of President 
Mphephu, Chief Ravhele became the new President of Venda. His government was more 
unpopular than that of Mphephu.  
88   TARG Report on Politico-Historical Background 16-17. According to TARG report, in 1979 
Chief Ramovha, the Deputy Minister of Post and Telegraphs, killed one Nyathela, a local 
high school principal, for ritual purposes. For the first time in Venda history a Chief was 
indicted and brought before the Supreme Court of Venda. Chief Ramovha was 
subsequently found guilty and sentenced to death and was in fact hanged. Throughout the 
so-called independence of Venda a considerable number of witch burnings and medicine 
murders occurred. People accused of witchcraft were burned or driven from their homes. 
The Cabinet Ministers and the top government officials were competing for power in the 
government. As a result, there were allegations that those political competitors indulged in 
medicine murders to secure their positions.  
 Witch 
burnings were associated with certain political motivations, personal jealousy of 
individual success,  and  the  settling  of  old scores. Medicine murders were 
89   Minnaar 1991 www.nu.ac.za/ 53. 
90   'Muti' is a Nguni term, which is always used to refer to medicine murder. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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commonly attributed to an individual's attempt to enhance his own personal 
power or to ensure success in a new business venture. Some of the traditional 
leaders were also accused of medicine murders.  
 
These accusations destroyed the credibility  of  the institution of  traditional 
leadership in Venda. Although not all of the traditional leaders were accused of 
witchcraft, they were no longer seen as the guardians and protectors of their 
subjects but as 'criminals' who murdered people for their material or political 
gain. As a result, traditional authorities lost a great deal of respect in the eyes of 
the Venda people.
91
The territory known as Ciskei was declared a self-governing area by the South 
African government in 1972 and its territorial authority was replaced with a 
Legislative Assembly.
 The traditional leaders also lost credibility in the eyes of 
their people because they were seen as the faithful supporters of the homeland 
system and administration.  
 
4.4   Ciskei 
92 The early independence years of Ciskei were marred 
with a plethora of challenges. For example, the Transkei government 
vehemently opposed the independence of Ciskei. Chief Matanzima pointed out 
that the Ciskei independence contravened the  Promotion of Black Self-
Government Act. As a result,  Chief  Matanzima warned Chief Sebe that the 
march of time would catch up with him. Chief Matanzima produced a petition 
document signed in 1976 by 12 Ciskei traditional leaders who were in favour of 
the incorporation of Ciskei into Transkei. Cooper et al  cited Matanzima as 
saying that:
93
                                            
91   Minnaar (n 89) 53. 
 
 
The Ciskei celebrations (and independence) were the culmination of 
a systematic defiance of the natural leaders of the Ciskei now scared 
of Chief Sebe's wrath. 
 
92   Zinge 1984 www.nu.ac.za/ 4. Since its independence in 1981, the Ciskei had become in 
many ways the most controversial of South Africa's homeland states. See also the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ciskei Act 20 of 1981. S 6(3) of Act 20 of 1981 provided for 
the representation of traditional leaders in the National Assembly. 
93     Cooper (n 67) 301. SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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Shortly before independence, Chief Sebe announced what was termed a 
'Package Deal'  agreed upon between himself and the then Minister of Co-
operation and Development, Koornhof. According to the deal, the envisaged 
independence of Ciskei was to be different from that negotiated by Transkei, 
Bophuthatswana and Venda. The 'Package Deal' inter alia stipulated that the 
Ciskeians would retain their identity and nationality while at the same time not 
surrendering their South African citizenship.
94  Subsequently, the Status of 
Ciskei Act
95
On 5
  was promulgated and Ciskei was granted independence on 
December 1980. 
 
 December 1980, the National Assembly of Ciskei chose Chief Sebe as 
the Executive President. Chief Sebe appointed a Vice President and eleven 
members of the Cabinet. The National Assembly consisted of 22 elected 
members, 33 nominated traditional leaders, one Paramount Chief and five 
members nominated by the President for their special knowledge, qualifications 
and experience.
96  Chief Sebe declared his intentions to support the idea of 
separate development by stating that the separate development of nations had 
always been a characteristic of traditional African life.
97  Sebe saw the 
homeland system as a way to re-establish  his people's  own traditions and 
customs both religiously and politically and not as a product of apartheid.
98
Chief Sebe was a commoner. He made all the necessary arrangements for his 
installation as a traditional leader. He declared himself a traditional leader in 
order to legitimise and justify his traditional and political power. Sebe stated 
clearly at his own installation ceremony that:
  
 
99
                                            
94     Cooper (n 67) 297. 
95   Act 110 of 1980. 
96     Cooper (n 67) 297. 
97   Chidester (n 26) 208. Chidester quoted Sebe as saying that: "Ciskei was our homeland 
where we lived as a proudly independent and free nation, quite separate and distinctly 
different from the other black nations of South Africa. The Ciskei nation was not being 
created but was being restored to its former glory." 
98   Chidester (n 26) 209. 
99   Chidester (n 26) 209. 
 
 SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
104/360 
The Chief was the central symbol of national honour and pride, the 
custodian of all those tribal and national customs and practices that 
are dear and sacred to the tribe. 
 
Ciskei's lesson is of great historical importance in the sense that it shows how 
the institution of traditional leadership was re-created by the apartheid 
government. It is therefore difficult to refer to pristine institutions of traditional 
leadership under these political circumstances. In fact, the traditional leaders 
and not the people supported the independence of Ciskei. It is evident that both 
the Ciskei parliament and the  Cabinet were staffed with traditional leaders. 
Suffice it to say that the traditional leaders in Ciskei including Chief Sebe 
manipulated the institution of traditional leadership to justify the concept of the 
homeland system and Ciskei nationality. 
 
 
5  The demise of the Bantustans and beyond 
5.1   A call for the transformation of traditional leadership 
The introduction of multi-party democracy brought the issue of traditional 
authorities, their history and roles in the new South Africa under a spotlight. 
Ntsebeza argued that the recognition of the hereditary institution of traditional 
leadership in the South African Constitution, while at the same time enshrining 
liberal democratic principles based on representative government in the same 
Constitution, is a fundamental contradiction. According to Ntsebeza, the two 
cannot exist at the same time for the simple reason that traditional leaders are 
born to the throne and not elected by the people.
100
Therefore Ntsebeza asserted that the recognition of the institution of traditional 
leadership compromised the democratic project that the post-apartheid 
government had committed itself to. More surprisingly, he asked why it was that 
an organisation such as the African National Congress (ANC), which fought for 
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a democratic unitary state after apartheid, would embrace the institution of 
traditional leadership, which had a notorious record under apartheid.
101
The debate on the future role of traditional leaders in a democratic South Africa 
led to the emergence of the schools of modernists and traditionalists 
respectively. According to Keulder, the modernists call for a major 
transformation of the institution of traditional leaders to meet the requirements 
of a modern, non-sexist and non-racial democracy.
 
 
102
For the institution of traditional leadership, despite past policies and practices, 
enjoyed substantial support and legitimacy.
  
 
The modernists were primarily concerned with gender equality and reviewed 
the institution of traditional leaders as the basis of rural patriarchy. On the other 
hand, the traditionalists believed that the institution of traditional leaders was at 
the heart of rural governance, political stability and rural development. They 
further argued that a traditional leader acted as a symbol of unity to maintain 
peace, preserve customs and culture, resolve disputes and faction fights, 
allocate land etc.  
 
103 However, as Keulder observed 
both the modernists and traditionalists agreed that the institution of traditional 
leadership, its composition, functions and legal manifestations should change in 
order to adapt to the changes in the new constitutional, social and political 
environments of post-apartheid South Africa.
104
6  Transitional dispensation: 1993 to 2003 
  
 
 
The constitutional transition was preceded by protracted negotiations which 
were aimed at creating a new order where all South Africans would be entitled 
to equality before the law. In terms of section 235 of the Interim Constitution of 
                                            
101  Ntsebeza (n 9) 258. 
102  Keulder Traditional Leaders 3-10. 
103  Keulder (n 102) 3-4. 
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the Republic of South Africa, legislation dealing with the administration of 
justice, traditional leadership and governance vested with the President of the 
Republic of South Africa in 1994. Some of these functions were later assigned 
to the competent authorities within the jurisdiction of different ministries and 
provinces.  
 
All the pieces of legislation from the homelands were assigned to the President 
and later re-assigned to the new provinces. Under section 235(8) of the Interim 
Constitution, the President was assigned and could re-assigned the 
administration of certain laws to a competent authority within the jurisdiction of 
the government of a province. Any such assignment would be regarded as 
having been made under the similar transitional arrangements in the 1996 
Constitution.  
 
Legislation dealing  with the administration of justice such as the  Black 
Administration Act
105 and certain legislation of the self-governing territories and 
the so-called independent states, for example, the Transkei Authorities Act,
106 
the  Regional Authorities Courts Act,
107  The  Chiefs Court Act,
108  the 
Bophuthatswana  Traditional Courts Act,
109  the Venda Traditional Leaders 
Administration Proclamation 29 of 1991 etc were temporarily assigned to the 
Department of Justice and Constitutional Development. The 1996 Constitution 
provides for the continuation of both pre-1994 legislation and various pieces of 
legislation issued in terms of the Interim Constitution including the old order 
legislation passed before 27 April by the homeland governments.
110
                                            
105  Act 38 of 1927. 
106  Act 4 of 1965. 
107    Act 13 of 1982. 
108  Act 6 of 1983. 
109  Act 29 of 1991. 
110    Olivier "Recent Developments" 78. 
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7  1993 Constitutional provisions 
7.1  1993 Constitutional dispensation 
In 1994, South Africa entered a new constitutional dispensation based on 
democracy, equality, fundamental rights, the promotion of national unity and 
reconciliation. The new constitutional dispensation culminated  in the Interim 
Constitution.
111
In the Interim Constitution, traditional authorities and indigenous and customary 
law were recognised and provision was made for certain functions of traditional 
leadership at central and provincial government levels. Chapter 11 provided for 
the  recognition of all existing traditional leaders and customary law. These 
constitutional provisions were as follows:
  The institution, status and role of traditional leadership 
according to indigenous law were recognised and protected in the Interim 
Constitution in accordance with the Constitutional Principle VIII. The roles and 
functions of traditional leadership were not defined in this Principle.    
 
112
(1) A traditional authority, which observes a system of indigenous 
law and is recognised by law immediately before the 
commencement of this Constitution, shall continue as such an 
authority and continue to exercise and perform the powers and 
functions vested in it in accordance with the applicable laws and 
customs, subject to any amendment or repeal of such laws and 
customs by a competent authority. 
 
 
 
(2) Indigenous law shall be subject to regulation by law. 
 
These Constitutional provisions were a victory for traditional leaders in the new 
democratic South Africa. Although Chapter 11 recognised and protected the 
institution, status and role of traditional leadership according to customary law, 
recognition of customary law and traditional leadership was subject to the 
supremacy of the Constitution and the Chapter on the Bill of Rights. Section 
160(3)(b) of the Interim Constitution provided that where applicable a provincial 
Constitution may provide for the institution, role, authority and status of a 
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traditional monarch in the province and would make provision for the Zulu 
monarch in case of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
In view of this constitutional arrangement, it is unsurprising that the traditional 
leaders negotiated for the type of the Constitution that would respect and 
uphold their aspirations and powers. The Interim Constitution provided for ex-
officio status of the traditional leaders in local government structures. This 
status was recognised by the Constitutional Court in ANC v Minister of Local 
Government and Housing, Kwazulu-Natal.
113 The Interim Constitution further 
provided a function for traditional leadership at the local level of government.
114 
It also provided for a National Council of Traditional Leaders at national level 
and a Provincial House of Traditional Leaders at provincial level.
115 Initially, the 
six Provincial Houses of the traditional leaders were established in terms of the 
legislation enacted by the provincial legislatures concerned.
116  These 
constitutional provisions were once again a victory for traditional leaders in the 
new democratic South Africa.
117
                                            
113  1998 (3) SA 1 (CC) 11. 
114 S 182 of Interim Constitution. 
115 S 184(1) of Interim Constitution. 
116  See Olivier "Traditional Leadership" 72. Provisional Houses of Traditional Leaders were 
established in North West, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, the Free State, Eastern Cape 
and Limpopo. See in this regard House of Traditional Leaders for the Province of the North 
West Act 12 of 1994, KwaZulu-Natal Act on the House of Traditional Leaders Act 7 of 
1994, Mpumalanga House of Traditional Leaders Act 4 of 1994 as amended in 1998, Free 
State House of Traditional Leaders Act 6 of 1994, Northern Province House of Traditional 
Leaders Act 6 of 1994 and Eastern Cape House of Traditional Leaders Act 1 of 1996. This 
provincial legislation is more or less similar in content. It determines the powers, functions 
and duties of the respective Houses. It also gives provinces powers to advise on and make 
recommendations on any draft Bill in respect of the status, powers and functions of 
traditional authorities, the affairs of traditional communities, traditional and customary law. 
At the time of writing this thesis some parts of the North West Province, which consisted of 
areas of Traditional Authorities, were incorporated into the Northern Cape Province. The 
Northern Cape Provincial Legislature was expected to pass legislation for the 
establishment of a House of Traditional leaders in that Province. 
117  S 183(1) of Interim Constitution. This section was mandatory and therefore six Provincial 
Houses of Traditional Leaders were established. According to Olivier constitutional 
Principles XIII, which provided for the recognition and protection of traditional leadership 
was of paramount importance. The Interim Constitution gave effect to the protection of the 
institutions of traditional leadership.  
  
 
CONTRALESA commented:  
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[T]he democratic dispensation developed in South Africa should be 
developed in a manner which reflects the values of the whole 
community it serves. The Constitution should therefore mirror the 
soul of the nation and it must include all the aspirations, beliefs and 
values. The institutions and role of traditional leaders, which have 
been in existence as longer than a liberal democracy in the West are 
to be treated with respect and accordingly be integrated within the 
structures of national, provincial and local government.  
 
 
7.2   1996 Constitutional settlement 
The 1996 Constitution is the supreme law of the country. Section 2 of the 
Constitution provides that the Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic. 
Law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid and the obligations imposed by it 
must be fulfilled. Section 2 must be read with section 1 of the Constitution, 
which also pronounces the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law. If 
all of these principles are read together, one principle is indisputable: the 
Constitution is supreme and everything and everybody is subject to it.  
 
Everything and everybody –  all  law and conduct, all traditions, customs, 
perceptions, customary rules and the system of traditional rule are influenced 
and qualified by the Constitution. The institution of traditional leadership is 
obliged to ensure full compliance with the core constitutional  values of human 
dignity, equality, non-sexism, human rights and freedom. The Constitutional 
Court confirmed the supremacy of the Constitution in S v Thebus,
118
Thus, any law which precedes the coming into force of the Constitution remains 
binding and valid only to the extent of its constitutional consistency. The 1996 
Constitution recognises the institution of traditional leadership. This recognition 
is housed in section 211(1), (2) and (3) of the Constitution.
 where it 
held that since the advent of constitutional democracy, all law must conform to 
the command of the supreme law, the Constitution, from which all law derives 
its legitimacy, force and validity.  
 
119
                                            
118  2003 (10) BCLR 1100 (CC) 1111. 
 
119  Ch 12 of the 1996 Constitution. See also In Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
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(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, 
according to customary law, are recognised, subject to the 
Constitution. 
 
(2) A traditional authority that observes a system of customary 
law may function subject to any applicable legislation and 
customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that 
legislation or those customs. 
 
(3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is 
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation 
that specifically deals with customary law. 
 
Traditional leadership is recognised subject to the 1996 Constitution and is 
required to be compatible with the Constitution. This constitutional provision 
requires the traditional leadership to change its own rules and practices not to 
be in conflict with the Bill of Rights. Discrimination on the ground of sex or 
gender would for example not be allowed and more inclusive participation in the 
decision-making processes will be considered.
120
                                                                                                                               
SA 744 (CC),  the court dealt with the provisions relating to traditional leadership to 
establish whether it was repugnant with the Constitution or not. The court in considering 
this matter held that s 211 and 212 of the New Text (NT) complied with the Constitutional 
Principle XIII. The court stated that whatever meaning the future court might give to the 
words "institution, status and role of traditional leaders", the requirements of Constitutional 
Principle XIII were carried out by s 211(1) which expressly declared that the institution, 
status and role of traditional leadership according to customary law were recognised 
subject to the Constitution. Accordingly, traditional leadership was protected by and found 
its place under the wide umbrella of the 1996 Constitution. The recognition of customary 
law and traditional leadership was  a mechanism to protect the cultural heritage of the 
African people.  
 The 1996 Constitution is a 
120    See in this regard Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2008 (9) BCLR 914 (CC) 933. The Shilubana 
case raised issues about the powers of the traditional authorities to develop their customs 
and traditions to promote gender equality in traditional leadership in accordance with the 
1996 Constitution. Ms Tinyiko Shilubana was appointed to a traditional leadership position 
for which she was disqualified by virtue of her gender. The Constitutional Court was called 
on to decide whether the Valoyi traditional community, in particular the traditional authority, 
has the authority to restore the position of traditional leadership to the house from which it 
was removed by reason of gender discrimination,  even if this discrimination occurred 
before the 1996 Constitution came into operation. In dealing with the appeal against a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, substantially confirming a decision of the 
Pretoria High Court, the Constitutional Court found as follows: That the Valoyi traditional 
authority restored the traditional leadership to a woman who would have been appointed 
traditional leader in 1968, were it not for the fact that she was a woman. As far as lineage 
is concerned, the traditional leadership was also restored to the line of Hosi Fofoza (Ms 
Shilubana's father) from which it was taken away on the basis that he had only a female 
and not a male heir.  The Constitutional Court further held that  the Valoyi traditional 
authority had authority to act on constitutional considerations in fulfilling their role in 
matters of traditional leadership. Their actions reflected in the appointment of Ms Tinyiko SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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legal effort to recreate a new and democratic institution of traditional leadership 
in South Africa.
121
8  Milieu of legislation and public policy  
  
 
 
8.1   Overview  
In the first ten years of democracy, the post-apartheid parliament of South 
Africa enacted a plethora of legislation and issued government policy intended 
to transform and democratise the institution of traditional leadership and the 
system of land administration and use. Various pieces of legislation and policy 
are discussed hereunder.  
 
8.2   White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance    
The White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance was a product of 
approximately four phases, namely research, debates, extensive consultation 
and discussions.
122 These discussions led to the production of a Draft White 
Paper  where  preliminary policy positions were outlined. The fourth phase 
witnessed the launch of the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and 
Governance that paved the way for the drafting of the Traditional Leadership 
and Governance Framework Act  41 of 2003  concerning the institution of 
traditional leadership.
123
The White Paper  was a culmination of a long process wherein the country 
engaged in a dialogue regarding the role and place of the institution of 
traditional leadership in contemporary South Africa as a democratic state. The 
key objectives of the White Paper  centred on the principle of creating an 
 
 
                                                                                                                               
Shilubana accordingly represented a development of customary law. The traditional 
authority intended to act to affirm constitutional values in traditional leadership in its 
community. It had the authority to do so.  
121    William 2004 JMAS. 
122  White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance (2003) 12-13. 
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institution which is democratic, representative, transparent and accountable to 
the traditional communities.  
 
 
9  Selected pieces of legislation 
The  Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act
124  (hereinafter 
referred to as the 'Framework Act') and the Communal Lands Rights Act
125 
(hereinafter referred as the 'CLARA') are intended among many other things to 
revamp and resuscitate the powers and functions of traditional leaders enjoyed 
under the notorious Black Authorities Act
126 and various pieces of homelands' 
legislation. For example, the Framework Act endorses tribal authorities, which 
were set up in terms of the Black Authorities Act  as a foundation for 
establishing the traditional councils,
127 while the Communal Land Rights Act
128 
recognises these councils as having the authority to administer and allocate 
land in the traditional authorities' areas.
129
                                            
124    Act 41 of 2003. The Framework Act took its cue from s 212(1) of the 1996 Constitution. 
This section provided that national legislation may provide for the role for traditional 
leadership as an institution at local level on matters affecting local communities. 
125    Act 11 of 2004.  The CLARA gives effect to s 25(5), which requires the state to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures to enable citizens' basis. It took its cue from s 
25(b) of the 1996 Constitution, which states that a person or community whose tenure of 
land is legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices, is 
entitled to the extent provided by the Act of parliament either to tenure which is legally 
secure, or to comparable redress. 
126    Act 68 of 1951. 
127    S 3 of the Framework Act provides for the establishment and recognition of traditional 
councils. S 20 of this Act provides for the role of a traditional council or traditional leaders 
in respect of: arts and culture, land administration, agriculture, health, welfare, the 
administration of justice, safety and security, economic development, environment, 
tourism, disaster management, the management of natural resources, the dissemination of 
information relating to government policies and programmes and the registration of births, 
deaths and customary marriages. The Act promotes and re-asserts the development role 
and local government functions played by the traditional leaders in their respective 
homelands. See also, the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Amendment 
Bill, 2008 which provides for the establishment of sub-traditional councils. 
128    Act 11 of 2004. If a Traditional Council in terms of the Framework Act is recognised by the 
community as its Land Administrative Committee, it is stated in the CLARA that the 
functional area of competence of such a Traditional Council is the administration of land 
affairs and not traditional leadership as contemplated in schedule 4 of the Constitution. 
See also s 21(2) of the CLARA. 
129  Ntsebeza (n 9) 14.  
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district or metropolitan municipality where more than one senior traditional 
leader exists.  
 
The  Framework Act  and various pieces of both the national and provincial 
legislation also provide for the establishment, composition, recognition and 
roles of respective provincial houses of traditional leaders and a national house 
of traditional leaders. These houses of traditional leaders are established 
horizontally in relation to each sphere of government in order to engender the 
principle of co-operative government. The following diagram illustrates the 
horizontal pattern of these houses in relation to each sphere of government:
130 
 
 
 
Other legislative initiatives affecting traditional leadership include amendments 
of the National House of Traditional Leaders Act,
131
                                            
130  See in this regard the manual issued by the Department of Co-operative Governance and 
Traditional Affairs. Toolkit 2009 
  various pieces of the 
www.cogta.gov.za/ 36. 
131    Act 10 of 1998. This legislation provides for the establishment of a Council to be known as 
the National House of Traditional Leaders. It further provides for the objects and functions 
of the House. See also the National House of Traditional Leaders Amendment Bill, 2008. 
This Bill makes a provision for key areas, which include inter alia the establishment of the 
National House of Traditional Leaders, alignment of the powers, functions and duties of 
the House with the White Paper on Traditional Leadership and Governance, 2003 and the SF KHUNOU    PER 2009(12)4 
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provincial legislation of the North-West Province, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, 
Northern Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal,
132 the Remuneration 
of Public Office Bearers Act
133 and finalisation of the Traditional Courts Bill, 
2008.
134
The above legislative initiatives demonstrate the government's intention to 
develop and reform the institution of traditional leadership, indigenous customs 
and practices considered to be in conflict with the democratic values 
entrenched in the Constitution. According to De Beer, the passing of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act
  
 
135 left nobody 
in any doubt about the parliament's intention to eradicate customs and 
practices perceived to be in conflict with the gender equality principle in the 
Constitution.
136
10  Conclusion  
 
 
 
In view of the preceding discussion, it is evident that both the apartheid and 
homelands' legislative frameworks altered the roles, powers and functions of 
traditional leaders. Moreover,  those various pieces of  legislation eroded the 
foundation upon which the institution of traditional leadership was founded and 
established. Just as the successive colonial and apartheid governments were 
ready to deal the institution of traditional  leadership  a mortal blow, the 
governments of the TBVC states did not hesitate to take the attack forward.  
 
Despite the fact that the political leadership of the TBVC states promised 
traditional leaders 'bread' and 'butter' before they could attain 'independence' 
                                                                                                                               
Framework Act, provision for support of the House by government, the accountability of 
the House and the relationship between the House and the Kings and Queens.  
132  Olivier (n 110) 81.  
133    Act 20 of 1998. This Act provides for the President to determine the remuneration and 
allowances payable to traditional leaders from the National Revenue Fund, after 
consultation with the National House of Traditional Leaders and the Commission on the 
Remuneration of representatives. 
134  Traditional Courts Bill B15-2008. 
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from South Africa, it was the same political leadership which eroded and 
undermined the powers and roles of the traditional leaders and exploited them 
to the fullest while they (the 'Presidents' of the TBVC states) were exploited by 
the  successive  apartheid governments. With the advent of the constitutional 
democracy in South Africa, the institution of traditional leadership is required to 
re-define itself within the  framework of a democratic dispensation. The 
government has been in the forefront of transforming the institution of traditional 
leadership for about 15 years, but it seems that the transformation has not got 
off the ground yet.  
 
This is a new ball game altogether. Whether or not the present government will 
completely democratise and transform the institution of traditional leadership is 
yet to be seen. As Donkers and Murray note, if the traditional leaders are to 
assume a dignified and just role in the new South Africa, they will have to deal 
with the  problems facing them within the constitutional and legislative 
framework, for they and they alone hold the key to transforming the challenges 
they face into prospects, and those prospects into a reality within the confines 
of a constitutional democracy.
137
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